Evolution in banking supervision by Ed Stevens
It’s no secret that the banking business
has been changing rapidly. Computer,
telecommunications, and satellite tech-
nologies have opened avenues for inter-
mediation and risk management that
were inconceivable as recently as 25
years ago. Moreover, whether indepen-
dently or because of pressures created by
technical change, a worldwide move-
ment toward less restrictive financial reg-
ulation has been at work.1  Global bank-
ing and financial markets have flourished
as barriers to the free flow of capital and
goods and services have fallen around
the world. In the United States, mergers
of large into ever-larger banking organi-
zations have accompanied the elimina-
tion of legal barriers to nationwide
branching. Combinations of banking,
securities, and insurance businesses were
emerging even before recent financial
modernization legislation clarified the
relaxation of regulatory restraints. 
Banking supervision has been adapting to
these vast structural changes both in the
United States and abroad. Traditionally,
supervision of safety and soundness
relied on bank examiners to test the qual-
ity of a bank’s assets and, indirectly, its
asset selection process. Examiners’
reports formed the basis for a supervisory
judgment about the adequacy of a bank’s
capital for absorbing potential unex-
pected losses. Like banking, however,
supervisory techniques are changing
around the world. Last year, the world-
wide Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision, operating under the auspices
of the Bank for International Settlements,
published proposals for a new supervi-
sory capital-adequacy framework that
would supercede its widely adopted 1988
capital accord. This Economic Commen-
tary describes the major innovations in
the new Basel Committee proposals,
placing them in the context of changing
banking and supervisory technology.
Before doing that, it will be helpful first
to consider why supervision is necessary
at all and then why the 1988 Basel capital
accord is said to be “in tatters.”
 Why Regulate and Supervise
Banks?
No one should have a more intense
concern for both the profits and safety
of a bank than its own shareholders.
That being the case, how can nonmarket
governmental supervisors be any better
at evaluating a complex banking organ-
ization’s risk exposures and need for
capital than the managers of that organ-
ization itself? 
One reason why banking regulation and
supervision are necessary is to redress
“moral hazard.” In most countries, banks
are protected by government safety nets,
typically including a lender-of-last-resort
facility and/or deposit insurance. Safety
nets can produce suboptimal market
results by inflating banks’incentives to
take risk. Banking regulation and super-
vision must replace the market discipline
removed by the safety net.
Asecond rationale—at least in the case
of Federal Reserve banking supervi-
sion—is that a Reserve bank carries on
a banking business, requiring careful
attention to its own counterparty risk
exposures. Each business day banks in
this country make about $1 trillion in
payments to one another. Asubstantial
share of these involve near-instantaneous,
irrevocable wire transfers of funds by
the Reserve banks for their banking cus-
tomers. In order to fund the wire trans-
fers, the Reserve banks extend some-
thing like $100 billion of daylight credit.
They must manage their resulting risk
exposure to protect themselves from any
loss that would result if a customer bank
were to fail without having repaid its
daylight borrowing. Managing this
exposure involves monitoring the credit
quality of their customer banks and
supervising their adherence to capital-
adequacy requirements. 
How to Supervise 
The moral hazard of a safety net as well
as prudent scrutiny of the central bank’s
customers provide a rationale for regulat-
ing and supervising banking organiza-
tions—to curtail risk taking. They do
not, however, explain how to do this or
to what degree. Traditional ex post tests
of a bank’s capital adequacy suffer from
several drawbacks, especially in super-
vising large, complex banking organiza-
tions. One is that the legal entity of a
bank is becoming increasingly irrelevant
in managing risk. Abanking organiza-
tion—a holding company or a bank with
bank and nonbank subsidiaries—typi-
cally manages lines of business that cut
across corporate legal boundaries. Super-
visors not only must be aware of the role
a particular bank plays in each line of
business, but must understand the risk-
management strategy of the whole bank-
ing organization in order to evaluate the
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Another is that risk management relies on
a variety of financial instruments whose
values vary day by day in response to
developments in securities markets.
Supervisors have responded to these two
difficulties by developing risk-focused
examinations. According to the General
Accounting Office, this approach “em-
phasizes a supervisory plan … tailored to
the institution’s risk profile and organiza-
tional structure.”2  Risk-focused exami-
nations deal with how to curtail risk, but
don’t provide criteria for how much risk
to curtail. The Basel risk-adjusted capital
guidelines represent a concerted global
effort to establish those criteria. 
International Standards
Abank’s capital typically is said to
include the amounts paid in by share-
holders and its retained earnings, as well
as certain liabilities that have lowest pri-
ority when paying off the creditors of a
failed bank. The larger a bank’s capital,
the larger the loss of asset value the bank
can sustain before depositors (and a
deposit insurance agency) suffer losses.
Minimum capital requirements are
among the earliest forms of government
regulation of banking. 
Increasing globalization of trade and
finance over the post–World War II
period resulted in increasingly intense
competition among banks. This drew
attention to international differences in
capital requirements and their role in
determining competitive advantages and
disadvantages in the global banking mar-
ket. Finally, after considerable negotia-
tion, the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision of the Bank for International
Settlements worked out the 1988 interna-
tional accord on capital regulation.3
The 1988 accord was an agreement
among the G-10 central banks to apply
common minimum regulatory capital
requirements to their respective banking
industries. The standards set the mini-
mum level of capital a bank should
maintain at 8 percent of risk-adjusted
exposure.4 This exposure is determined
as a weighted average of the value of a
bank’s assets and equivalent off-balance-
sheet items. The framework, updated
several times over the intervening years,
still provides the foundation for mini-
mum risk-adjusted capital standards in
the major national banking systems of
the world. 
The idea behind the accord is simply that
a bank’s capital should be commensurate
with the riskiness of its business. The
framework has two main parts. The first
defines what to include in a measure of
capital, distinguishing between two
types—primary and secondary. The
bank’s common stock and noncumula-
tive perpetual preferred stock issues,
plus certain reserves, are included in pri-
mary capital, while secondary capital
consists of other kinds of reserves and
other classes of stock, plus certain liabil-
ities, including subordinated term debt.5 
The other part of the framework lays out
a weighting system used to calculate a
minimum capital standard for each bank.
Weights are 0, 10, 20, 50, or 100 percent,
and they are applied to specific types of
assets and off-balance-sheet items, de-
pending on the nature of the financial
instrument and borrower, although
national supervisors have some discre-
tion over their own guidelines. Cash and
government securities of the bank’s own
country get a risk weight of zero, claims
on public-sector entities get 10 percent,
claims on banks incorporated in OECD
nations, 20 percent, fully secured mort-
gages on residential property, 50 percent,
while all other claims on private-sector
entities get a 100 percent risk weight.
Market-risk provisions were added in
1996. These address the risk that
changes in interest rates will change the
market value of a financial instrument.
They apply to interest-rate-related
instruments and equities in a bank’s trad-
ing account, and foreign-exchange and
commodities risks throughout the whole
bank.6 The sum of all risk-weighted
assets, when multiplied by 8 percent,
produces the minimum capital required
by the supervisory process.
 Diminishing Effectiveness 
of the 1988 Accord 
Despite the shift to risk-focused examina-
tions, risk-based capital guidelines have
become less and less effective as a basis
for supervisory judgments about the qual-
ity of a banking organization. This espe-
cially applies to the largest, most com-
plex banking organizations, and to a
lesser extent to all banking organizations
as they move into new financial technolo-
gies. Capital arbitrage has seriously
eroded the effectiveness of the arbitrary
risk weights regulators use to determine a
bank’s minimum need for capital.
“Capital arbitrage” characterizes a vari-
ety of techniques banks use to reduce the
impact of binding capital requirements.
To see how, one must distinguish be-
tween the regulatory and the economic
perceptions of adequate capital. Regula-
tory capital corresponds to the risk-based
requirements associated with the Basel
accord. Economic capital is what a bank
would hold in the absence of regulation
to achieve a desired position on its
risk/return trade-off. In general, regula-
tory capital requirements can be ex-
pected to constrain the behavior of banks
as long as supervision is designed to
compensate for the failure of market dis-
cipline to price risk taking appropriately.
This means that banks must maintain
more capital than they have an economic
incentive to hold. Equivalently, banks
have an incentive to devise ways of
avoiding the requirement. In the last
decade of the twentieth century, banks
have been able to respond to these incen-
tives with some ease. New financial
technologies have increased the substi-
tutability of loans and securities, while
derivative instruments enable risks to be
deconstructed into marketable compo-
nents. Two main features characterize
most of the ever-increasing variety of
capital arbitrage techniques: “cherry
picking” and securitization.7
Cherry picking refers to practices that
shift a bank’s portfolio toward the riskier
of two loans when supervisors would put
both loans in the same “risk bucket.”
Banks have an incentive to accommo-
date the credit needs of high-quality bor-
rowers in ways that avoid straight loans
in order to achieve a lower risk weight.
Securitization is the act of packaging and
selling loans as marketable securities. It
is the usual method banks use to shed
their lower-risk loans. The problem with
this method, however, is that the market
frequently requires that such securities be
“enhanced” or “insured.” The most
straightforward enhancement is to sell
them with “recourse,” where the bank
selling the securitized loans retains liabil-
ity in the case of default. Simply selling a
loan-backed security with recourse could
be worse than holding the loans them-
selves because recourse requires a 100
percent capital requirement. 
Banks have found ways around this,
however, by exploiting a provision in the
accord which treats these financial guar-
antees more favorably for regulatorypurposes if the enhanced assets are not
owned by the bank. The bank accom-
plishes this by “remote origination,” cre-
ating an organization that officially orig-
inates the loan (referred to as a “special
purpose vehicle” or SPV). Abank refers
customers who satisfy its underwriting
criteria to the SPV, which in turn funds
the loans. The SPV funds the loans by
issuing securities, such as commercial
paper, with a significant credit enhance-
ment from the bank. Note that if this
enhancement is 100 percent, there is no
risk on the securites the SPV issues.
From the standpoint of the bank, the
method is identical to funding the loans
and selling them with recourse except
that the credit enhancement is treated as
a direct credit substitute for regulatory
purposes. This amount can be substan-
tially less than the amount of credit
issued by the “vehicle.” Other more
complex arrangements involving indi-
rect credit enhancements are also used,
tailored to the unique circumstances of
particular customers. 
Notice that these techniques economize
on capital in two ways. First, securitized
or enhanced assets carry a lower risk
weight when calculating regulatory cap-
ital. Second, assets that remain in the
bank’s portfolio after cherry picking and
securitization carry no higher risk weight
despite the fact that these capital arbi-
trage techniques reduce the average
quality of assets in a given risk bucket.
 AProposed New Capital-
Adequacy Framework
In June of last year the Basel Committee
requested public comments by March 31,
2000, on a proposal for a new capital-
adequacy framework.8 The proposed
framework is intended to maintain at
least current levels of bank capital and to
“enhance competitive equality.” It differs
from the existing framework in a number
of ways, but primary interest centers on
two new approaches for determining
minimum regulatory capital. One would
replace the arbitrary risk weights with
weights based on external credit ratings.
The other would tailor the determination
to the unique risk profile of each institu-
tion through reliance on that institution’s
own internal risk ratings.
External ratings 
The first approach effectively would
reduce weights on the highest-quality
assets and increase weights on lower-
quality assets. Banks’claims on govern-
ments, other banks, securities firms, and
all other corporations would be rooted in
the professional judgments of rating
agencies such as Standard and Poors,
Moody’s, and Fitch IBCA. Table 1 is a
simplified illustrative example based on
Standard and Poor’s rating system.
Replacing arbitrary risk buckets with
weights based on external ratings could
reduce the present incentive to cherry
pick. Also, the proposed new framework
would replace the current arbitrary
weights for securitizations with weights
based on external ratings that should
more effectively reflect actual risks. Pre-
sumably, the recourse or insurance part
of the asset that is attached to many secu-
ritized loans would have a higher risk
weight—given its lower value—than
the underlying securities themselves. 
Internal ratings 
Risk management at internationally
active banking organizations is becom-
ing a highly sophisticated scientific dis-
cipline involving models of market,
credit, and operational risks that are
intended for use in the analysis of com-
pensation, customer profitability, pric-
ing, portfolio allocation, and capital
needs. Models of market risk are better
developed than others because historical
data are readily available and all banks’
exposures derive from the common pool
of securities available in the market.
Credit-risk modeling is more difficult,
given the vast number of unique poten-
tial borrowers and very little in the way
of a common pool of historical informa-
tion available to all banks.9  Risk ranking
of assets within a bank will be more reli-
able than across banks because true risk
can be very institution specific.
Nonetheless, “the Basel Committee …
believes that an internal ratings-based
approach could form the basis for setting
capital charges for some sophisticated
banks.” This supervisory approach must
overcome two hurdles to become practi-
cable. One is the challenge to both banks
and supervisors of translating internal
relative credit ratings into absolute capi-
tal requirements. The other is the super-
visory challenge of achieving consis-
tency both among the sophisticated
banks for whom an internal ratings-
based methodology is feasible and
between those banks and others for
whom the standardized external ratings-
based methodology is appropriate. 
So far, the internal ratings-based ap-
proach is a methodology in the making,
not yet an operational option. As an
indication of future practice, however, 
it highlights the significant shift that is
taking place in banking supervision.
Periodic examination for compliance
with arbitrary regulatory requirements 
is giving way to continuous monitoring
based on an understanding of each
bank’s own technically sophisticated
risk-management strategies.
 Concluding Comment
The 1988 Basel accord has become out-
moded. For many banking organizations,
the Committee’s new proposal to employ
external ratings in judging asset risk
could remove some of the existing incen-
tive for capital arbitrage. At the same
time, for the largest, internationally ac-
tive banking organizations, the possibil-
ity of focusing supervisory attention on
their emerging internal risk-management
methods could enhance the effectiveness
of the supervisory process by putting
both bank and supervisor “on the same
page.” In both cases, the new proposals
would reduce inconsistencies between
regulatory and economic estimates of the
risk of one asset relative to that of
another, thereby removing a major incen-
tive for capital arbitrage. However, the
TABLE 1 PROPOSED WEIGHTS FOR CALCULATING
CAPITALREQUIREMENTS
Assessment (percent)
AAA BBB+ BB+ 
Claim to AA– A+ to A– to BBB– to B– Below B– Unrated
Governments 0 20c 50c 100c 150 100c
Banks       Option 1a 20 50c 100c 100c 150 100c
Option 2b 20 50c 50c 100c 150 50c
Corporates 20 100c 100c 100c 150 100 
a. Risk weighting based on risk weighting of sovereign in which the bank is incorporated.
b. Risk weighting based on the assessment of the individual bank.
c. Claims on banks of a short original maturity, for example less than six months, would receive a 
weighting that is one category more favorable than the usual risk weight on the bank’s claims.
SOURCE: Adapted from “ANew Capital Adequacy Framework” (see footnote 8), p. 31.unique supervisory problem remains that
of judging how much capital is adequate
both for the risk profile of a bank as well
as for the moral hazard generated by the
banking safety net.
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